I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh – the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control (...) subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing do. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so-called Buridan cases. (shrink)

Among the many forms of artistic expression that characterize the digital era, remix occupies a rather central position. At the same time, however, the success of remix as an artistic practice raises several hard questions. What is original and what is derived? How can we sort out and make sense of questions concerning origination and derivation in situations where one thing is appropriated, reused, and repurposed for something else? What theory of moral and aesthetic value can accommodate and explain these (...) situations where authorship, authority, and origination are already distributed across a network of derivations, borrowings, and re-appropriated found objects? This paper develops a response to these questions, and it does so in three steps or movements. The first briefly introduces the concept of remix and the opportunities and challenges that this now wide-spread, content creation practice presents to existing models and theories of moral and aesthetic value. The second outlines the three elements of what I call “remixology”—a new axiology (or theory of moral and aesthetic value) that is designed to scale to these new opportunities and challenges. The third and final movement investigates the consequences of this proposal, demonstrating how remixology can be read backwards through time, providing us with some new perspectives on artistry and creativity in all human endeavors, and read forwards into the emerging challenges that have been made available by innovations in algorithmic content generation and computational creativity. (shrink)

This article addresses the sensitive topic of human rights issues in Indonesia through a Kantian analysis. Cases of human rights violations are a common occurrence in Indonesia. Presently, human rights violations in the country are assessed from historical and legal perspectives. However, there is little commitment or willingness on the part of the Indonesian government to protect and defend the principles of human rights. This article is attempts to utilize arguments from political philosophy that can contextualize the protection and implementation (...) of human rights in Indonesia, through an analysis of the concept of social contract in Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy. According to Kant, freedom and equality are natural rights. This article demonstrates that Kant's social contract theory is linear with his formal moral philosophy. In his explanation, ‘contract’ is unified will. Therefore, the Indonesian state with its power is responsible to implement the will of the public to ensure order and rule of law and to protect the rights and freedom of each individual. (shrink)

In a series of well known publications, Christine Korsgaard argues for the claim that an agent acts morally just in case s/he acts autonomously. Two of Korsgaard's signature arguments for the connection between morality and autonomy are the "argument from spontaneity" and the "regress argument." In this paper, I argue that neither the argument from spontaneity nor the regress argument is able to show that an agent would be acting wrongly even if s/he acts in a paradigmatically heteronomous fashion.

A cura di Ignazio Licata, Ammar J. Sakaji Jeffrey A. Barrett, Enrico Celeghini, Leonardo Chiatti, Maurizio Consoli, Davide Fiscaletti, Ervin Goldfain, Annick Lesne, Maria Paola Lombardo, Mohammad Mehrafarin, Ronald Mirman, Ulrich Mohrhoff, Renato Nobili, Farrin Payandeh, Eliano Pessa, L.I Petrova, Erasmo Recami, Giovanni Salesi, Francesco Maria Scarpa, Mohammad Vahid Takook, Giuseppe Vitiello This volume comes out from an informal discussion between friends and colleagues on the answer:what topic do you think as fundamental in theoretical physics nowadays? Obviously wereceived different answers (...) according to the disposition and the different research areas, and answersin superposition state too. And yet some attractors have emerged pointing out the keys forthe Physicists conception of Nature, all of them converging towards a group of stronglyinterconnectedproblems. Let's see them one by one:. The concept of particle identity in Quantum Mechanics (QM) and Quantum Field Theory (QFT);. The relationship between QM and QFT, in particular the non -local aspects in Field Theory andthe problem of non-perturbative solutions;. The local/global problem in the relationship between particle physics and cosmology;. The role of Renormalization group in describing the meso and macroscopic emergent behaviour;. The possible extension of Poincaré symmetry group and Quantum cosmology;. Higgs "mechanism" and the origin of mass. (shrink)

New trends in the economic systems management in the context of modern global challenges: collective monograph / scientific edited by M. Bezpartochnyi, in 2 Vol. // VUZF University of Finance, Business and Entrepreneurship. – Sofia: VUZF Publishing House “St. Grigorii Bogoslov”, 2020. – Vol. 1. – 309 p.

Questo non è un libro perfetto, ma è unico, e se scorri le prime 400 pagine o giù di lì, le ultime 300 (circa 700) sono un buon tentativo di applicare ciò che è noto sul comportamento ai cambiamenti sociali nella violenza e nelle maniere nel tempo. L'argomento di base è: come fa la nostra genetica a controllare e limitare il cambiamento sociale? Sorprendentemente non riesce a descrivere la natura della selezione dei parenti (idoneità inclusiva) che spiega gran parte della (...) vita sociale animale e umana. Egli manca anche (come quasi tutti) manca di un quadro chiaro per descrivere la struttura logica della razionalità (termine preferito di John Searle) che preferisco chiamare la Psicologia descrittiva del Pensiero dell'Ordine Superiore (DPHOT). Avrebbe dovuto dire qualcosa sui molti altri modi di abusare e sfruttare le persone e il pianeta, dal momento che questi sono ora molto più gravi da rendere quasi irrilevanti altre forme di violenza. Estendere il concetto di violenza per includere leconseguenze globali a lungoterminedella replicazione dei geni diqualcuno, e avere una comprensione della natura di come funziona l'evoluzione (cioè la selezione dei parenti) fornirà una prospettiva molto diversa sulla storia, gli eventi attuali e come le cose probabilmente andranno nei prossimi centinaia di anni. Si potrebbe iniziare notando che la diminuzione della violenza fisica nel corso della storia è stata abbinata (e resa possibile) dallo stupro spietato in costante aumento del pianeta (cioè dalla distruzione del futuro del proprio discendente).’ Pinker (come la maggior parte delle persone) è spesso distratto dalle superficialità della cultura quando è la biologia che conta. Guarda le mie recenti recensioni di Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' e 'SuperCooperators' di Nowak e Highfield qui e in rete per un breve riassunto della vacuità del 'vero altruismo'(selezione di gruppo), e l'operazione di selezione dei parenti e l'inutilità e la superficialità di descrivere il comportamento in termini culturali. Questo è il classico problema della natura/nutrimento e la natura vince nutrita --infinitamente. Ciò che conta veramente è la violenza fatta sulla terra dall'incessante aumento della popolazione e della distruzione delle risorse (a causa della medicina e della tecnologia e della repressione dei conflitti da parte della polizia e dei militari). Circa 200.000 persone in più al giorno (un altro Las Vegas ogni 10 giorni, un'altra Los Angeles ogni mese), le 6 tonnellate o giù di lì di pisolino che vanno in mare / persona / anno – circa l'1% del totale del mondo che scompare ogni anno, ecc. significa che se qualche miracolo accadrà la biosfera e la civiltà crollerà in gran parte durante i prossimi due secoli, e ci sarà fame, violenza e violenza di ogni tipo su scala impressionante. Le maniere, le opinioni e le tendenze delle persone a commettere atti violenti non hanno alcuna importanza a meno che non possano fare qualcosa per evitare questa catastrofe, e non vedo come ciò accadrà. Non c'è spazio per gli argomenti, e nessun punto sia (sì io sono un fatalista), quindi mi limiterò a fare alcuni commenti come se fossero fatti. Non immaginate di avere un'informazione personale nel promuovere un gruppo a spese degli altri. Io sono 78, nonhanno discendenti e non hanno parenti stretti e non si identificano con alcun gruppo politico, nazionale o religioso e considerano quelli a cui appartengo di default come ripugnanti come tutti gli altri. I genitori sono i peggiori nemici della vita sulla Terra e, tenendo la vista generale delle cose, le donne sono violente come gli uomini se si considera il fatto che la violenza delle donne (come la maggior parte di quella fatta dagli uomini) è in gran parte fatta al rallentatore, a distanza nel tempo e nello spazio e per lo più effettuata per procura dai loro discendenti e dagli uomini. Sempre più spesso, le donne portano figli indipendentemente dal fatto che abbiano un compagno e l'effetto di impedire a una donna di riprodursi è in media molto maggiore dell'arresto di un uomo, poiché sono il collo di bottiglia riproduttivo. Si può ritenere che le persone e la loro prole meritino riccamente qualsiasi miseria arrivi la loro strada e (con rare eccezioni) i ricchi e famosi sono i peggiori trasgressori. Meryl Streep o Bill Gates o J.K Rowling e ognuno dei loro figli può distruggere 50 tonnellate di suolo ogni anno per generazioni nel futuro, mentre un contadino indiano e il suo possono distruggere 1 tonnellata. Se qualcuno nega che va bene, e ai loro discendenti dico "Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra" (WTHOE). Oggi l'accento è sempre posto sui diritti dell'uomo, ma è chiaro che se si vuole che la civiltà abbia una possibilità, le responsabilità umane devono sostituire i diritti umani. Nessuno ottiene diritti senza essere un cittadino responsabile e la prima cosa che ciò significa è ladistruzione ambientalemi nimal. La responsabilità più fondamentale non è quella dei bambini a meno che la vostra società non vi chieda di produrli. Una società o un mondo che permette alle persone di allevare a caso sarà sempre sfruttato dai geni egoisti fino a quando non crolla (o raggiunge un punto in cui la vita è così orribile che non vale la pena di vivere). Se la società continua a mantenerei diritti umani come primari, ai loro discendenti si può dire con fiducia "WTHOE". Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Ang Noli Me Tangere at El Filibusterismo ay mga nobelang isinulat ni Dr. Jose P. Rizal na sumasalamin sa kalagayan ng mga Pilipino noong panahon ng mga Español. Ikinubli ni Rizal ang mga di-makatáong pagtrato ng mga Español sa mga itinuring na Indio sa pamamagitan ng mga pangyayari at mga karakter sa kaniyang dalawang akda. Mula sa Teorya ng Moral na Pag-unlad (Theory of Moral Development) ng isang Amerikanong Sikolohistang si Lawrence Kohlberg ay sinuri ng papel na ito ang 10 (...) tagpo na nagpapakita ng katungkulang moral sa dalawang nobela gámit ang Antas at Yugto ng Moral na Pag-unlad ni Kohlberg (Kohlberg’s Levels and Stages of Moral Development). Mula sa ginawang pagsusuri, napagtanto ng papel na ito na gumamit si Rizal ng estratehiya upang ipakita na ang aksiyong isinagawa ng ahente sa bawat tagpo ay taliwas sa kaniyang kabuoang moralidad, bagaman ang pamamaraang ito ay nagdulot sa mga mambabása ng Noli Me Tangere at El Filibusterismo ng iba’t ibang interpretasyon at pagkaunawa sa mga isinulat ng may-akda. Mapanghámon ang mga nobela ni Rizal na sumusubok sa tradisyonal na kaugalian at panuntunan ng Pilipinas maging sa pagkukunwari ng lipunang Pilipino. Malaki ang naging gampanin ng nabuong tema na sumisimbolo sa mga isyung panlipunang nais palutangin ni Rizal. Gayunpaman, dahil sa mataas na pangangatwirang moral na nakapaloob sa kaniyang mga gawa, nararapat na gamítin ito hindi lámang bílang materyal sa pagaaral ng Filipino at sa mga kaugnay na larang, kundi pati rin sa pag-aaral ng kritisismo sa politika at lipunan, maging sa pag-aaral ng etika at moralidad, partikular na sa konteksto ng Pilipinas. (shrink)

Che ne dite di una diversa ripercorrere i ricchi e i famosi? Prima l'ovvio: i romanzi di Harry Potter sono una superstizione primitiva che incoraggia i bambini a credere nella fantasia piuttosto che assumersi la responsabilità per il mondo, ovviamente. JKR è altrettanto all'oscuro di se stessa e del mondo come la maggior partedelle persone , macirca 200 volte più distruttivo come l'americano medio e circa 800 volte più di cinese medio. È stata responsabile della distruzione di forse 30.000 ettari (...) di foresta per produrre questi romanzi spazzatura e tutta l'erosione che ne deriva (non banale come'è almeno 6 e forse 12 tonnellate / anno suolo nell'oceano per tutti sulla terra o forse 100 tonnellate per americano, e così circa 5000 tonnellate / anno per i libri e mov ies Rowlinge isuoi 3 bambini). La terra perde almeno l'1% del suo suolo superiore ogni anno, così come si avvicina a 2100, la maggior parte della sua capacità di coltivazione alimentare sarà andato. Poi c'è l'enorme quantità di carburante bruciato e rifiuti fatti per fare e distribuire i libri e film, bambole di plastica, ecc. Dimostra la sua mancanza di responsabilità sociale producendo figli piuttosto che usare i suoi milioni per incoraggiare la pianificazione familiare o acquistare la foresta pluviale, e promuovendo la tradizionale stupidità liberale della terza supremazia mondiale che sta distruggendo la Gran Bretagna, l'America, il mondo e il futuro del suo discendente. Certo, non è poi così diversa dalle altre 7. 8 miliardi all'oscuro - solo più rumoroso e più distruttivo. È il problema nessun pranzo gratuito scritto grande. La folla proprio non può vedere che non esiste una cosa come aiutare una persona senza danneggiare gli altri. I diritti o i privilegi concessi ai nuovi operatori in un mondo sovraffollato non possono chedim inish quelli degli altri. Nonostante i massicci disastri ecologici che accadono di fronte a loro ovunque ogni giorno, non possono fissarli alla maternità sfrenata del "diverso", che rappresenta la maggior parte dell'aumento della popolazione del secolo scorso e tutto questo in questo. Non hanno una combinazione di intelligenza, istruzione, esperienza e sanità mentale necessarie per estrapolare gli assalti quotidiani alle risorse e al funzionamento della società fino all'eventuale collasso della civiltà industriale. Ogni pasto, ogni viaggio in auto o in autobus, ogni paio di scarpe è un altro chiodo nella bara della terra. Probabilmente non ha mai attraversato la sua mente che un sedile su un aereo da Londra a San Francisco produce circa una tonnellata di carbonio che si scioglie circa 3 metri quadrati di ghiaccio marino e come una delle overprivileged che ha probabilmente volato centinaia di tali voli. Non solo i ricchi e famosi, ma quasi tutti i personaggi pubblici, compresi praticamente tutti gli insegnanti, sono spinti ad essere politicamente corretti, che nelle democrazie occidentali, ora significa socialdemocratico(neomarxista, cioè comunisti diluiti) terzo suprematisti del mondo che lavorano per la distruzione delle loro società e dei loro discendenti. Così, coloro la cui mancanzadiistruzione, esperienza, intelligenza (e buon senso di base), che dovrebbe proibire loro di fare qualsiasi dichiarazione pubblica a tutti, dominano totalmente tutti i media, creando l'impressione che l'intelligente e civile deve favorire la democrazia, la diversità e l'uguaglianza, mentre la verità è che questi sono i problemi e non le soluzioni, e che essi stessi sono i primi nemici della civiltà. Vedere il mio suicidio per democrazia 2nd ed (2019). (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to analyze the concept of ecstasy in F. W. J. Schelling's Erlangen Lectures. In particular, I intend to show how it constitutes a significant evolution with regard to the model of reminiscence and in particular that of Mitwissenschaft, as presented in the Weltalter. The essay focuses on three aspects of the notion of ecstasy: 1) its relation to temporality, 2) its relation to interiority, and 3) its noetic value and its moral dimension. In conclusion, (...) I will show how in Erlangen a movement of progressive de-historicization and de-theosophicization of ecstasy began, culminating in the Berliner Einleitung of 1842/43. (shrink)

How should we adjust our beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than ourselves, such as experts and other epistemic superiors? In this paper, I develop and defend a deference model of epistemic authority. The paper attempts to resolve the debate between the preemption view and the total evidence view of epistemic authority by taking an accuracy-first approach to the issue of how we should respond to authoritative and expert testimony. I argue (...) that when we look at the debate through the lens of accuracy, it becomes clear that matters are more complicated than either the preemption view or the total evidence view are able to account for. Consequently, a deference model, outlined within a credence-based framework, does a better job of capturing the relevant phenomena, and explaining how we should update our beliefs in response to epistemically authoritative testimony. (shrink)

When interacting with other people, we assume that they have their reasons for what they do and believe, and experience recognizable feelings and emotions. When people act from weakness of will or are otherwise irrational, what they do can still be comprehensible to us, since we know what it is like to fall for temptation and act against one’s better judgment. Still, when someone’s experiences, feelings and way of thinking is vastly different from our own, understanding them becomes increasingly difficult. (...) Delusions and psychosis are often seen as marking the end of intelligibility. In this paper, I argue first for the importance of seeing other people as intelligible as long as this is at all possible. Second, I argue, based on both previous literature and my own lived experience, that more psychotic phenomena than previously thought can be rendered at least somewhat intelligible. Besides bizarre experiences like illusions, hallucinations and intense feelings of significance, I also explain what it is like to lose one’s bedrock, and how this loss impacts which beliefs one has reason to reject. Finally, I give an inside account of some disturbances of reason, and show that there are important similarities between certain psychotic reasoning problems and common non-pathological phenomena. (shrink)

Nos proponemos estudiar las objeciones de Cavendish hacia la filosofía experimental desde una perspectiva no dicotómica para mostrar que, lejos de establecer un enfrentamiento entre la filosofía contemplativa y la experimental, la razón y la sensación, o la naturaleza y el arte, la autora plantea una cooperación organizada entre estos aspectos. La postura de Cavendish puede comprenderse adecuadamente si se tiene en cuenta que su epistemología se arraiga en su metafísica, en la que los grados de la materia y los (...) distintos seres vivos que conforman el universo ocupan un lugar determinado y cumplen cierta función conformando una totalidad orgánica y armónica. (shrink)

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called (...) hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are reasons to believe that an implicit bias for normalcy influences what are considered medically necessary treatments in psychiatry. First, we outline two prima facie reasons to suspect that this is the case. A bias for ‘the normal’ is already documented in disability studies; it is reasonable to suspect that it affects psychiatry too, since psychiatric patients, like disabled people, are often perceived as ‘weird’ by others. Secondly, psychiatry's explicitly endorsed values of well-being (...) and function are hard to measure directly, which is why we see simpler box-ticking conceptions of recovery used in large research studies. This need not be problematic, but might lead to researchers and clinicians focusing too much on treatments that promote easy-to-measure proxies for recovery, instead of what actually matters to psychiatric patients themselves. Next, we provide examples of treatments and treatment decisions within two areas – self-injury and psychosis – which are hard to explain unless we assume that an implicit and harmful normalcy bias is at work. We conclude with some suggestions for clinicians and future research. (shrink)

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. -/- La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)

The medical and social model of disability is discussed and debated among researchers, scholars, activists, and people in general. It is common to hold a mixed view and believe that some disabled people suffer more from social obstacles and others more from medical problems inherent in their bodies or minds. Rachel Cooper discusses possible ‘test environments’, making explicit an idea which likely plays an implicit part in many disability discussions. We place or imagine placing the disabled person in a range (...) of different environments. If there is a relevant test environment in which they do fine, their problem was societal/external; if there is not, it was medical/internal. Cooper admits that deciding on the appropriate range of test environments is an ethical and political question. In this chapter, I argue that we often ought to widen our scope when discussing psychiatric disabilities. (shrink)

Quoique l’on trouve plusieurs explications de l’ontologie du Bien dans l’œuvre d’Aristote, on n’y trouve qu’une seule explication de l’ontologie du mal. En Métaphysique Θ 8 et 9, la description du rapport entre la puissance et l’acte prépare le chemin vers une explication ontologique du mal comme la privation d’un bien. Le but de cet article est de montrer que cette doctrine du mal comme privation constitue le fondement métaphysique de toute la philosophie pratique aristotélicienne et d’illustrer la continuité entre (...) les doctrines de la vertu, du vice et du bonheur et la doctrine du mal comme privation. (shrink)

It has been argued that we cannot be morally responsible in the sense required to deserve blame or punishment if the world is deterministic, but still morally responsible in the sense of being apt targets for moral criticism. Desert-entailing moral responsibility is supposed to be more freedom-demanding than other kinds of responsibility, since it justifies subjecting people to blame and punishments, is nonconsequentialist, and has been shown by thought experiments to be incompatible with determinism. In this paper, I will show (...) that all these arguments can be resisted. (shrink)

Justin Garson introduces the distinction between two views on Madness we encounter again and again throughout history: Madness as dysfunction, and Madness as strategy. On the latter view, Madness serves some purpose for the person experiencing it, even if it’s simultaneously harmful. The strategy view makes intelligible why Madness often holds a certain allure – even when it’s prima facie terrifying. Moreover, if Madness is a strategy in Garson’s metaphorical sense – if it serves a purpose – it makes sense (...) to use consciously chosen strategies for living with Madness that doesn’t necessarily aim to annihilate or repress it as far as possible. In this paper, we use our own respective stories as case studies. We have both struggled to resist the allure of Madness, and both ended up embracing a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism about reality instead of clinging to sane reality. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...) belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

Durante los siglos XVII y XVIII hubo un intenso debate en las Islas Británicas en torno al materialismo. Mi objetivo consiste en caracterizar la postura de David Hume en el marco de ese debate. Sostengo que, no obstante rechazar la metafísica sustancialista para centrarse en el estudio de las percepciones, Hume sienta una posición respecto de la relación entre mente y materia. Sin embargo, esa posición reviste cierta complejidad en tanto no es explicitada en los textos que se editaron en (...) vida de Hume. Propongo definirla como un materialismo restringido, ya que, respecto de la naturaleza de la mente, Hume desestima tanto las posturas materialista como inmaterialista, pero respecto de las causas del pensamiento, termina acercándose al materialismo a partir de argumentos basados en la experiencia y en la analogía con la naturaleza. (shrink)

O presente artigo incide sobre o conceito de expressão no âmbito do pensamento leibniziano, pretendendo, a partir da sua análise, expor a crítica que Fernando Gil lhe tece, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à ideia de “causalidade expressiva”. Passando por vários conceitos leibnizianos como “substância simples”, “força”, “apetição” ou “entre-expressão”, o que se pretende analisar é a reflexão de Fernando Gil relativamente àquilo que o autor considera “a aporia da expressão leibniziana”, e, ainda, a sua reabilitação da inteligibilidade expressiva como (...) pensamento do contínuo, onde inteligibilidade, beleza e simplicidade se implicam mutuamente. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A restricted interpretation of Humean methodology understands his experimentalism solely in terms of reducing epistemic statements to private sensory impressions accessible via introspection. My aim is to revise this interpretation by means of criticizing the connection it establishes between the maxim of not going beyond experience and the copy principle. I will show that this interpretation is inconsistent with the way Hume conceives the experimental method, since there is textual evidence to affirm that experience should not be understood in (...) terms of sensory impressions only, and that the science of human nature is not restricted to the study of the mental contents only, but it is nourished in the same way by the observation of social interaction. Finally, I will argue that the method Hume proposes does not prevent intersubjective verification of the empirical evidence, since the principle of sympathy enables the communication of mental states, which makes them devoid of their private character. (shrink)

En la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII tuvo lugar un debate entre Thomas Reid y Joseph Priestley acerca de la naturaleza de la mente y su interacción con el cuerpo. En el marco de la defensa de la religión cristiana y en nombre de principios metodológicos experimentalistas y newtonianos, los autores defienden propuestas radicalmente diferentes acerca de la relación entre la mente y la materia. Sus divergencias se vinculan con la interpretación del método newtoniano y su concepción de la materia, (...) lo que delineará dos actitudes: una dualista, de carácter más conservador por parte de Reid y una materialista, heterodoxa e innovadora por parte de Priestley. (shrink)

In this book symposium text, I focus on Ciurria’s critique of P. F. Strawson’s incredibly influential paper “Freedom and Resentment”, and more generally present-day Strawsonians about moral responsibility. Ciurria rightfully argues that the picture painted of “our responsibility practices” is highly idealized; it ignores crucial power asymmetries and oppression. I agree with this. However, it seems to me that Ciurria sometimes lacks awareness of exactly how profound the disagreement between her and Strawson and his followers is.

Martha Nussbaum argues that animals are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of “unnatural” animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast’s belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed (...) are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs. (shrink)

Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few (...) breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks. (shrink)

En este trabajo nos proponemos hacer un aporte para esclarecer el sentido y la función de la experiencia en el marco de la teoría del conocimiento de Hume. Para ello examinaremos dos interpretaciones que pueden reconstruirse en la literatura secundaria: la que la entiende como impresiones simples de sensación y la que la concibe como patrones de percepciones conectadas. Consideramos que la primera perspectiva no es adecuada para comprender el rol epistémico de la experiencia, lo que nos inclina hacia la (...) segunda interpretación. Sin embargo, esta última no ha sido lo suficientemente desarrollada por los autores que la sugieren. Nuestro propósito es llevar a cabo esa tarea pendiente, ofreciendo una serie de precisiones que la hacen más robusta a los fines de elucidar por qué para Hume la experiencia es la piedra de toque en el conocimiento sobre cuestiones de hecho. Así, mostraremos que el sentido que adquiere la experiencia en las inferencias causales es el de casos que recogemos mediante la observación y organizamos en colecciones o patrones, los que funcionan como evidencia para establecer o justificar enunciados epistémicos. Por último, para comprender la especificidad de su función en este tipo de inferencias, distinguiremos la experiencia de las impresiones y del hábito. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion (...) about moral expertise. (shrink)

Saul Smilansky’s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky’s dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons (...) not to blame them. These reasons must be we ighed against each other (and against relevant consequentialist reasons) in order to find out what we all things considered ought to do. (shrink)

My response to Rashed's critique of my account as theorizing instead of showing what it is like.

Published on Daily Philosophy 2021-10-18 Why do we have a criminal justice system? What could possibly justify the state punishing its citizens? Philosophers, scholars of law, politicians and others have proposed different justifications, one of them being retributivism: the view that we ought to give offenders the suffering that they deserve for harming others. However, intentionally harming other people and making them suffer is serious business. If we are to do this in the name of what’s right and good, we (...) better be very certain that what we do really is right and good. The so-called Epistemic Argument Against Retributivism calls this certainty into question. (shrink)

The belief that obese people ought to lose weight and keep it off is widespread, and has a profound negative impact on the lives of the obese. I argue in this paper that most obese people have no such obligation, even if obesity is bad, and caused by calorie input exceeding output. Obese people do not have an obligation to achieve long-term weight loss if this is impossible for them, is worse than the alternative, or requires such an enormous effort (...) in relation to what stands to be gained that this option is supererogatory rather than obligatory. It is highly plausible that most obese people fall into one of these three groups. Politicians may still have obligations to fight obesity, but they ought to do so through progressive politics rather than blaming and shaming. (shrink)

O que é a «harmonia universal»? Uma causa, um efeito, um estado-de-coisas? Como Leibniz escreve a este respeito numa carta a Magnus Wedderkopf, a última razão para o intelecto divino e, consequentemente, a vontade de Deus, é a harmonia. Porém, como razão última, nada existe para lá da própria harmonia. Segundo o raciocínio leibniziano, a harmonia pode assim ser perspetivada não só como um estado-de-coisas, mas também como causa da própria organização das coisas. Muito embora a harmonia possa ser perspetivada (...) de diferentes modos, que manifestam uma unidade entre si, o foco desta análise incide justamente sobre a possibilidade de «perceber», «percecionar», ou melhor, «compreender» a harmonia universal. (shrink)

The concept of expression has always held an important place in Fernando Gil’s thought. The author’s reflection on the idea of expression is well reflected among his writings – either in his early essays or throughout his entire work –, attaining a special focus in the lectures that he gave at Johns Hopkins University during the years of 2002, 2003 and 2004. Actually, these lectures represent the strongest testimony of the relevancy given by Fernando Gil to this concept. However, despite (...) being a concept which crosses all his work, clearly having a central place in his thought, Fernando Gil never got to write a systematic theory on the concept of expression. Thus, closely following the author’s works, the main purpose of this study is to suggest a personal vision of what could have been Fernando Gil’s theory on expression. Combining some of the main ideas of Johns Hopkins lectures to some fundamental notions of Fernando Gil’s thought, we will try to show that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is a theory on the ordination of thought, on cognitive construction and, above all, a theory on the elevation of thought to what shall be considered its higher modality, the aesthetical thought. In fact, our major hypothesis is that Fernando Gil’s theory on expression is not only a cognitive theory but also an aesthetical one. As such, its major guidelines shall be: to explain the adequacy of expression to its objects; to show how expression evolves according to the cognitive development of the subject; and, finally, to explain and to justify the elevation of thought to universality, harmony and beauty. (shrink)

The book covers scientific and philosophical topics by bringing them closer to literature. Some topics are scientific explanation, the concept of cause, rational argumentation, pseudoscience, language, ethics, philosophy of mind, posthumanism, and democracy. Summary Prefazione di Severino Saccardi. Introduzione. Capitolo 1: Le scrivanie di Eddington. 1.1. Il vecchio Qfwfq (I. Calvino. Le cosmicomiche). 1.2. L’assassino invisibile (L.F. Celine, Il dottor Semmelweis). 1.3. Gli gnommeri di Ingravallo (C.E. Gadda, Quer pasticciaccio brutto de via Merulana). 1.4. I sergenti di Napoleone (L. Tolstoj, (...) Guerra e pace). 1.5. Tex e il Coyote nero (G. Bonelli, Il Coyote nero). 1.6. “Elementare Watson!” (A.C. Doyle, Il segno dei quattro). Capitolo 2. Non saranno mai delusi. 2.1. L’albero di Natale. (V. Perrin, Cambiare l’acqua ai fiori). 2.2. Il dagherrotipo di Buendia. (G.G. Marquez, Cent’anni di solitudine). 2.3. Don Ferrante e la peste. (A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi). Capitolo 3. Capitolo puffo. 3.1. L’Accademia di Lagado. (J. Swift, I viaggi di Gulliver). 3.2. Bruto è uomo d’onore. (W. Shakespeare, Giulio Cesare). 3.3. Le oche mute. (G. Orwell, 1984). Capitolo 4. “Quarantadue!” 4.1. Lo zio N’Ba N’Ga. (I. Calvino, Le cosmicomiche). 4.2. La mosca cocchiera. (J. de La Fontaine, Favole). 4.3. Il fiore del dr. Dek. (E. Salgari, Le meraviglie del Duemila). Capitolo 5. L’ultimo uomo. 5.1. La pernice accusatrice. (Cyrano de Bergerac, Gli stati e gli imperi del Sole). 5.2. Pallino in via Mjasnickaja. (M.A. Bulgakov, Cuore di cane). Capitolo 6. Scenari perturbanti. 6.1. Dissipatio. (G. Morselli, Dissipatio H.G.). 6.2. Un mammifero meccanizzato. (S. Butler, Erewhon). 6.3. Mlle Olimpia. (E.T.A. Hoffmann, Racconti notturni). Capitolo 7. La gente perbene. 7.1. La balena bianca. (H. Melville, Moby Dick). 7.2. Betsabea Everdeene. (T. Hardy, Via dalla pazza folla). 7.3. Un’idea francese. (C. McCarthy, Cavalli selvaggi). 7.4. Le montagne del Montana. (D. Delillo, Rumore bianco). (shrink)

We propose an extension of Discourse Respresentation Theory (DRT) for analyzing pictorial narratives. We test drive our PicDRT framework by analyzing the way authors represent characters’ mental states and perception in comics. Our investigation goes beyond Abusch and Rooth (2017) in handling not just free perception sequences, but also a form of apparent perspective blending somewhat reminiscent of free indirect discourse.

Trope theory is the view that the world consists (wholly or partly) of particular qualities, or tropes. This admittedly thin core assumption leaves plenty of room for variation. Still, most trope theorists agree that their theory is best developed as a one-category theory according to which there is nothing but tropes. Most hold that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of resembling tropes. And most hold that concrete particulars are made up from tropes in compresence (for an overview, (...) including an introduction to some alternative versions of the view, cf. Maurin, 2014). D. M. Armstrong disagrees. He thinks the world is a world of immanent universals, the thin particulars in which those universals are instantiated, and the states of affairs that—thereby—exist. He holds that ‘sameness of property’ should be explained in terms of numerically identical universals or—if the resembling things are the universals themselves—in terms of partially identical universals. And he believes that concrete particulars are made up from ‘thin particulars’ in which a (sufficient) number of universals are instantiated. In spite of their disagreements, proponents of tropes owe Armstrong a debt of gratitude. First, for being one of the theory’s earliest, most serious, and—not least—most prominent, critics (Armstrong for the first time considers, and rejects, what he then labels ‘particularism’, in his 1978a). But also for being one of the theory’s most ardent champions. Already in his 1989a, Armstrong regrets his 1978-rejection of the view. Equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes, he now admits, for most purposes “serve as an excellent substitute for universals” (Armstrong 1989a, 122). But then why isn’t Armstrong a trope theorist? In this paper, Armstrong’s main reasons for rejecting the trope view are critically scrutinized. All of them, it is maintained, fail to convince. If this argument is accepted, Armstrong seems to have no—or, at least, no good—reason for not accepting the existence of tropes. But, then, ought Armstrong to have been a trope theorist? If the ‘best’ version of the trope view turns out to be ontologically more parsimonious than Armstrong’s own theory of universals, then, yes. That there is a version of the trope view, a version that is not (or, at least not seriously) considered by Armstrong, that is ontologically more parsimonious than the universals view, is argued in the next section. Why none of Armstrong’s reasons for preferring universals to tropes manage to convince, is explained in the section after that. First, however, and in order to avoid a common misunderstanding of the trope view and, as a consequence, of why one ought to reject it, a few more words about the core-difference between tropes and universals, and about how this difference matters (as well as does not matter) to what—and how well—these theories explain. (shrink)

My aim is to look into the representational aspect of ideas, exploring not only to what Hume refers as adequate ideas, but also these cases where for a number of reasons an idea does not reach that standard. It has been suggested that the latter are fictions, but an in-depth examination of Hume texts reveals that there are several types of imperfections, such as incompleteness or imprecision that prevent an idea from being adequate. This leads to an analysis of the (...) status of supposed or pretended ideas, and the possibility of there being terms with no ideas annexed to them. (shrink)

A diagnosis based exclusively on the so-called scientifi c evidence does not take into account the problem of the theoryladenness, widely debated in Twentieth Century epistemology. The theory of knowledge developed by Ludwik Fleck, physician and philosopher active in the 30s, can still be useful for shedding light on how psychiatric diagnoses are infl uenced by a specifi c thought style that directs the observations and affects the development of knowledge and the formation of connections between concepts.

Broadly speaking, “empiricism” is a label that usually denotes an epistemological view that emphasizes the role that experience plays in forming concepts and acquiring and justifying knowledge. In contemporary philosophy, there are some authors who call themselves as empiricists, although there are differences in the way they define what experience consists in, how it is related to theory, and the role experience plays in discovering and justifying knowledge, etc. (e.g., Ayer 1936; Van Fraassen 2002). In contrast, in the early modern (...) period, empiricism was not a label that philosophers traditionally characterized until nowadays as empiricists (most famously, John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume) used to describe their doctrines. Indeed, as attributed to early modern philosophical authors, empiricism is not an actor’s category, but an analytic historiographical category retrospectively applied to them and confronted to rationalism, whose main representatives were considered to be Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, and G.W. Leibniz. Such a narrative began to be established by the late nineteenthcentury and described early modern empiricism as an epistemological stance maintaining (1) that the origin of all mental contents lies in experience (a genetic statement), and (2) that knowledge can only be justified a posteriori (an epistemic statement). This entails that empiricists deny the existence of innate mental contents and the possibility of a purely a priori knowledge. In the history of early modern science such a dichotomy has been usually rendered in terms of the opposition between continental rationalist Cartesian science vs British empiricist Newtonian science. In the last four decades, many aspects of this traditional narrative have been criticized, and the meaning of early modern empiricism is subject of renewed studies. (shrink)

Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

This paper approaches Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness from a mereological perspective. Taking as inspiration Bergson’s idea that pure durée is a multiplicity of interpenetration, I will show, from within Husserlian phenomenology, that the absolute flow can indeed be described as a whole of interpenetrating parts. This mereological perspective will inform my re-consideration of the much-discussed issue of Husserl’s self-criticism concerning the schema of content and apprehension. It will also reveal a fundamental similarity between Husserl’s conception of the absolute flow and (...) Sartre’s conception of lived temporality. This paper consists of four sections. Section 2 presents the basic elements of Husserl’s mereology. Section 3 introduces the difficulty encountered by Husserl’s early account of time that makes use of the schema. I will examine Barry Dainton’s criticism of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness against the background of the older debate between Meinong and Stern, a debate that has informed Husserl’s own account. Section 4 distinguishes two common criticisms of the schema from Husserl’s own self-criticism, which is in turn divided into two steps. It is shown how the second step of this self-criticism implies the interpenetration of the absolute flow and responds to Dainton’s criticism. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with some comparative remarks. I will show how Husserl’s notion of absolute flow, as mereologically interpreted, anticipates Sartre’s conception of consciousness as self-transcendence, as well as how it accommodates the apparently conflicting mereological intuitions of Aristotle and Bergson. (shrink)